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Abstract  
 In this work we apply graph theoretic tools to 
provide a close bound on a frontier relating the 
number of line outages in a grid to the power disrupted 
by the outages.  This frontier describes the boundary of 
a space relating the possible severity of a disturbance 
in terms of power disruption, from zero to some 
maximum on the boundary, to the number line outages 
involved in the event. We present the usefulness of this 
analysis with a complete analysis of a 30 bus system, 
and present results for larger systems. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Electric power systems are operated economically 
and safely. The least expensive resources are used to 
supply energy demand, taking into account the 
exposure of the grid to unanticipated events.  In 
practice, operating procedures are followed to ensure 
that minimally the network can withstand any single 
contingency with little effect beyond the location of the 
disturbance.  This well-known “N-1 criterion” is 
sensible and achievable since all single contingencies 
may be anticipated in the a priori planning stage.  
Nevertheless, medium- and large-scale blackout do 
occur as a result of multiple, near simultaneous events. 
 
One challenge in anticipating such events is the 
limit of computational power to perform an exhaustive 
brute-force study of possibilities. For example, to 
consider all 4-line outages in a 20,000 line system 
requires nearly 4x1016 scenarios. Such a study is 
presently beyond the capabilities of the fastest 
supercomputers.  Some judgement must be made to 
facilitate these types of analyses.  It is clear that many 
outages have little impact and are not important. 
 
We suggest that it is useful to consider both the 
number of line outages involved in an event and the 
overall impact of the disturbance. The former is a 
measure of the likelihood (or ease, if malicious) of an 
event, and the latter is a measure of its severity. In the 
study of extreme events, both are important. In this 
work we introduce a “vulnerability frontier” to 
simultaneously address these two concerns.  As we 
detail in Section 2, the frontier plots the maximum 
power imbalance in the system as a function of the 
number of line outages. There are at least three 
practical uses for this frontier: 
 
1. Identification of specific severe disturbances.  The 
points on this frontier correspond to possible 
events that deserve further study. 
2. Compare relative system vulnerability.  The 
frontier depends on system topology and power 
injections. A comparison of different frontiers 
corresponding to different conditions may allow 
relative comparison of system vulnerability to 
extreme events. 
3. Identification of Critical Corridors.  The cutsets 
corresponding to points on the frontier appear in 
notable patterns.  Those occurring in high 
frequency should be studied to determine if they 
represent critical corridors. 
 
The development and analysis of the vulnerability 
frontier evolves from our prior work on power system 
worst-case studies. In [1,2] we proposed a bilevel 
optimization formulation for the study of N-k 
contingency analysis. We pursued a worst-case 
formulation to identify scenarios that might have the 
greatest impact. In an initial screening stage we 
identified the fewest line removals which would 
necessitate a minimum amount of load shedding to 
maintain the integrity of the entire grid (or 
alternatively, the k lines that would require the most 
load shed). A subsequent stage performed detailed 
analyses on exhaustive subsets of these lines.  That 
prior work recognized the trade-off between the 
number of lines and the severity of events.  We 
explored this trade-off in [3], and continue with this 
paper. 
 
In [3] we introduced a graph-theoretic approach to 
relate the number of lines cut to the possible severity of 
the disturbance.  We posed the problem in an 
optimization framework with a parameter describing 
the trade-off between lines cut and severity, and we 
compared three slightly different formulations.   For a 
user-specified value of the trade-off parameters, we 
found the  worst line cuts relative to a severity 
function. 
 
We close this section with a brief discussion of 
related work in the literature. Multiple contingency 
identification in power systems has been addressed 
recently. Salmeron, Wood and Baldick [4] employed a 
bilevel optimization framework along with mixed-
integer linear programming to analyze the security of 
electric grid under terrorist threat. The critical elements 
of the grid were identified by maximizing the long-
term disruption in the power system operation caused 
by terrorist attacks based upon limited offensive 
resources. The bilevel programming framework has 
also been used by Arroyo and Galiana [5].  
 
We emphasize that we pursue a deterministic, 
worst-case framework because we would like to 
anticipate events that include those arising from 
malicious design.  For a probabilistic approach to N-k 
analysis for naturally occurring events, the reader may 
consider the stochastic approach proposed in [6]. 
The static collapse of power systems is closely 
associated with network topology. Our previous work 
[1] showed that an approximate power flow description 
provides a way to relate static collapse with graph 
partitioning using spectral graph theory. Grijalva and 
Sauer [7,8] related topological cuts with the static 
collapse based on branch complex flows. He et. al. [9] 
used a voltage stability margin index to identify weak 
locations in a power network.   
 
In addition to these largely static analyses, there 
are many papers that address dynamics of the grid in 
the context of complex systems and cascading outages. 
There are different levels of detail of models and the 
information they provide.  Simulations of the most 
detailed models of the grid tend to be computationally 
costly and are not amenable to repeated study. Simpler 
models allow repeated simulation or some direct 
analysis and may be used to infer some properties of 
the grid and the risk of cascading outages.  In 
[10,11,12] a long-term model of the grid is used that 
represents increases in loading and upgrades to 
equipment in response to events. In the short term, 
initiating events may cascade as components overload.  
Simulation of this model reveals failure statistics 
consistent with those observed in the power grid.  The 
same authors have also studied probabilistic models 
with the aim to better understand cascade propogation 
[13,14,15].  Knowledge of characteristics of cascade 
propagation may allow and estimation of system 
vulnerability to an extreme event and help the design 
of procedures to mitigate cascading outages. 
 
2. The Vulnerability Frontier  
 
We define the Vulnerability Frontier as the set of 
points relating the number lines lost to the maximum 
amount of power disrupted by their removal. Thus, for 
a three-line removal scenario, the corresponding point 
on the frontier is equal to the maximum immediate 
power imbalance possible for any three-line cut.  The 
network is immediately vulnerable to this amount of 
imbalance. 
 
The necessary calculations to determine the 
frontier are directly related to graph partitioning 
problems.  To this end we define an indicator vector, x, 
whose elements equal to {-1,1} separate the system 
nodes into two groups. The number of lines in the 
cutset that separates the groups is exactly equal to 
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where L = ATA is the Laplacian matrix and A is the 
branch-node incidence matrix associated with the 
network graph.  The directed power flowing from one 
group (xi = 1) to the other group (xi = -1) is 
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where p is a vector of power injections. This is equal to 
the immediate power imbalance that would be caused 
by the loss of lines on the cutset. 
 
Note that there are 2N-1 ways to group the  N nodes 
of a network, so it is not feasible to consider them all.  
For the frontier we are only interested in certain worst-
case groupings, those equal to the greatest potential 
power imbalance for every specified number of line 
outages.  Even this reduced set of points is difficult to 
compute, and it is indeed computationally NP-Hard 
[16].  Here we offer an algorithm for finding certain 
cutset, power imbalance pairs that both lie on, and 
bound the frontier. 
 
We pose the following optimization problem: 
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where c is a trade-off parameter. When c is small, the 
problems simplifies to a simple minimum cut problem.  
For large enough c, the solution will completely 
separate the generators from the loads to achieve the 
maximum imbalance. For intermediate values for c, as 
the parameter value tends from 0 to infinity, the 
solutions are found with an increasing number of cuts 
and increasing power imbalance. 
 
For a fixed value for the trade-off parameters, an 
exact integer solution for (1) can be efficiently 
calculated through a conversion to a related min 
cut/max flow problem [16]. Max-flow/min-cut 
problems can be solved very efficiently in practice by 
polynomial-time algorithms (see for instance [6]), 
which enables repeated solutions of the problem for 
various trade-off parameters.  Our contribution here is 
to suggest an algorithm to allow the calculation of all 
solutions to (1) as the parameters varies, and hence 
calculate all the points that lie on and bound the 
frontier.  The number of points is unknown before the 
calculation, but it is trivially bounded by the total 
number of lines in the system and can be expected to 
be much less. 
 
Let’s consider how the solution of (1) changes as c 
increases. For a fixed grouping described by xo  the 
cost function in (1) is a linear function of c.  For a 
different grouping, x∞, the cost will be described by a 
different line. These lines intersect at a point that 
separates which of the two solutions has lower cost.  
This is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
As previously noted, there are 2N-1 possible 
groupings and we can’t consider them all.  If we could, 
we would simply trace along the lowest positioned 
lines as we increased the value of c. The set of lines in 
this trace form the solutions of (1) we seek.  Instead, 
we start with two easily found lines that belong to the 
solution sets: the limiting solutions corresponding to 
the min cut (small c) and the max power imbalance 
(large c). Suppose these are the solutions shown in 
Figure 1.  To determine if there are any other solutions 
for intermediate values of c, we first determine the 
value, c*, where the lines intersect.  Next we solve (1) 
using this value.  If the solution is identical to either of 
the two existing solutions, then no other solution exists 
for c in that interval.  Otherwise the solution 
corresponds to a new line.  This is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1. Plot of cost functions for two different 
groupings as a function of the trade-off parameter 
c. 
 
Figure 2. Plot of cost functions for three different 
groupings.  The third grouping comes from the 
solution of (1) using the parameter value at the 
intersection of the first two lines. 
 
We repeat this process, calculating the intersection 
of the new line to neighboring lines and calculate new 
solutions.  Note that this process is bounded!  The total 
number of possible solutions is equal to at most the 
total number of lines in the system and is likely much 
less. 
 
3. Example: 30 bus system  
 
Here we consider the 30-bus example shown in 
Figure 3. The power injections are listed in Table 1. 
Following the procedure described in the previous 
section we find the boundary lines (solutions) shown in 
Figure 4. The complete vulnerability frontier for this 
network is shown in Figure 5. For this network, the 
bounding points correspond to cutset sizes 0, 1, 5, 7, 
11, and 14. This system is small enough to allow 
calculation of the entire boundary including those 
points that lie below the shaded area in Figure 5.  
These correspond to lines cuts numbering 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 
10, and 12.  The points for cuts of size 2 and 13 are not 
shown because they are identical to the preceding 
points.  That is, there is no 2-line cut solution with 
greater power imbalance than the 1-line cut solution. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A 30-bus test system. 
 
Figure 4. Trace of minimum objective function 
along the bounding lines for the 30-bus example. 
 
Figure 5. The Vulnerability Frontier for the 30 bus 
system.  The shaded area connecting points at 0, 1, 
5, 7, 11, and 14 bound the frontier. 
Table 1. Power Injections for the 30-bus system 
Bus P Bus P Bus P 
1 18 11 0 21 -88 
2 96 12 -56 22 158 
3 -12 13 210 23 130 
4 -38 14 -31 24 -44 
5 0 15 -41 25 0 
6 0 16 -18 26 -17 
7 -114 17 -45 27 210 
8 -150 18 -16 28 0 
9 0 19 -48 29 -12 
10 -29 20 -11 30 -53 
 
In the introduction we mentioned three uses for the 
vulnerability frontier.  First,  the points on the 
boundary represent actual conditions that might occur, 
and that might warrant further investigation.  The first 
point corresponding to a single line outages is 
associated with the line connecting the generator at bus 
13 to the system through bus 12.  This is an obvious 
vulnerability.  The point corresponding to 5 line 
outages includes this single line outage as well four 
lines that isolate buses 21-27, 29 and 30. This separates 
the generator at bus 13 and the three large generators in 
the lower portion of the grid from the load-rich portion 
at the top of the grid.  These five lines cause an 
imbalance of 70% of total load.  A detailed study using 
an AC power flow and/or dynamic simulation will 
likely show that the loss of a subset of these lines can 
lead to an extreme event. 
 
Second, comparison of different operating 
conditions will alter the vulnerability frontier and allow 
comparison of relative system vulnerability.  We leave 
this for future investigation.  Third, cutsets that appear 
in solutions on the frontier with high frequency should 
be investigated further as critical corridors.  These are 
evidently paths over which a high proportion of power 
flows relative to the number of lines.  A more detailed 
study may be needed to account for other factors 
including line capacities.  In the 12 solutions shown in 
Figure 5, a number of corridors are identified.  The 
obvious path connecting generator 13 to bus 12 occurs 
in all 12 solutions.  The set of four lines isolating the 
lower generators discussed above shows up in 9 of the 
solutions.  The four lines separating generators 1 and 2 
from the rest of the grid occur in 5 of the solutions.  
The two lines isolating the peninsular load buses 29 
and 30 show up in 5 of the solutions. The single line 
connecting load bus 26 occurs in four of the solutions.  
These cuts dominate the solutions.  There are only 
three other cuts that appear in any of the 12 solutions, 
and only once each. 
 
 
 
4. Computational Requirements 
 
It is appropriate to comment on the computational 
benefits of our method, compared to the complete 
enumeration over all possible partitions. 
 
Constructing the  vulnerability frontier by complete 
enumeration involves the analysis of all possible power 
imbalance scenarios obtained by dividing system nodes 
into two separate groups.  There are 2N-1 possible ways 
to do this, where N is the number of nodes in the 
system. 
 
In stark contrast, our method for bounding the frontier 
involves no more than the calculation of M graph 
partitions, where M is the number of lines in the 
network. The dominant computation cost is in the 
graph partitioning algorithm.  We used a max-flow 
implementation described in [17] which scales as 
O(N3).  Other algorithms exist with better scalings, 
such as Sleator’s and Tarjan’s O(NM/log(N)) algorithm 
[18].  A history of maximum flow bounds and relevant 
references is found in [19] 
  
While the bound on computational scaling for our 
approach, O(MN3), is not inconsequential, it is 
infinitesimal compared to the 2N-1 scenarios considered 
by complete enumeration.  Futhermore, the O(MN3) 
bound is a worst case  bound; significantly lower 
computational requirements can be expected in practice 
[17]. 
 
Of course the two approaches do not provide exactly 
the same information.  Our approach yields those 
points that lie on the frontier and that bound the 
remaining points. Complete enumeration will provide 
all points on the frontier (as well as those that do not).  
 
 
 
5. Discussion and Summary 
 
In this paper we have focused on the calculation 
for a vulnerability frontier.  The points on the frontier 
represent the immediate power imbalance that is 
possible for a given number of line removals.   These 
calculations are based on and exploit graph theoretic 
concepts, and have the advantage of being easily 
calculable.  For a larger example, we present the 
vulnerability frontier for a 13,374 node system in 
Figure 6. The graph-theoretic approach does not 
provide a complete analysis of the actual system 
response to such disturbance.  It is likely that line 
outages such as those on the frontier will result in a 
larger disturbance as the system may have difficulty 
responding to the immediate power imbalance.  
 
Dynamic phenomena such as network cascading 
behavior are not explicitly represented in this stage of 
our work.  The vulnerability frontier can be 
conceptually expanded to include such analyses in 
future work.  In this paper the maximum immediate 
power imbalance (vertical axis) is plotted against 
number of line outages.  A useful variant, but more 
difficult to calculate, is to represent the eventual total 
power disrupted versus the initial number of line 
outages.  Such a  complete answer would require 
application of simulation based tools to an exhaustive 
set of initiating and probabilistic cascading events, 
which presently is not feasible.   
 
 
Figure 6. Vulnerability Frontier for a 13,374 node 
system. 
Our initial observations that the subsets of cutsets 
appear frequently in conditions corresponding to points 
on the frontier suggests that these cuts may correspond 
to critical paths.  They are evidently sets of lines that 
have a large amount of directed power flow.  These 
paths may represent an immediate vulnerabilities to 
malicious attack, or may represent an intermediate 
vulnerability if a smaller disturbance were to cascade 
to remove these paths – a point at which the cascade 
may become difficult or impossible to mitigate. 
 
Our graph theoretic static model is best used at this 
time as a screening tool.  The events and paths 
identified are useful for directing detailed analysis.  
Simulating all possible events is not possible, but 
simulating events suggested from analysis of the 
vulnerability frontier will likely reveal some system 
weaknesses. Additionally, while our static formulation 
focuses on topological and power imbalance features in 
detail, other important phenomenon are not modeled.  
At this point we have not included any model of 
system dynamics. There are substantial theoretical 
obstacles to extending our approach to incorporate all 
dynamic concerns. 
 
More promising is the inclusion of line flow limits 
in our model.  The present analysis requires a complete 
physical separation of the grid into two parts through 
the removal of lines. We recognize than an effective 
separation can be achieved through the imposition of 
transmission limits on the remaining lines after a 
number of other are removed from service.  We are 
pursuing a graph-theoretic line of research to include 
capacity constraints in our model.  This will improve 
its use as a screening tool as we will still recommend 
detailed analysis using dynamic models. 
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